

**MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Eastern and Southern African Region**

Draft

**SERVICE DELIVERY SURVEYS:
A MEANS OF INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
IN LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICE DELIVERY**

CASE STUDIES OF PILOT SURVEYS IN KWEKWE AND MARONDERA, ZIMBABWE

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CONTENTS

	page
Foreword	
Acknowledgements	
1. Introduction	
1.1 Background	1
1.2 The survey locations	1
1.3 The survey methodology	1
1.4 The present report	1
2. Findings of the Pilot Surveys	
2.1 Introduction	2
2.2 Selection of respondents	3
2.3 Profile of respondents	3
2.4 Experience of the housing delivery system	6
2.5 Extent of complaint and redress	11
2.6 Incidence of corruption	13
2.7 Recommendations	17
3. The Potential of the SDS Approach	
3.1 Introduction	19
3.2 Impact of the pilot surveys	19
3.3 The SDS methodology'	10
3.4 Conclusion	22
References	22
Appendix 1: National workshop, May 1998	

1. Foreword

The 1990s can be characterised as the era of new public administration and management as shown by emphasis on decentralisation, democratic principles, good governance, transparency, good economic management in the way governments conduct their business. Local governments have assumed a central role in provision of services. However, decentralisation has put to test the credibility and integrity of local governments. A major fear of decentralising political power, fiscal resources and revenue raising authority is partly lack of technical capacity and partly lack of trust at the local level to manage public affairs efficiently and honestly.

Several local governments have fallen into financial difficulties due to poor financial management including strong allegations of corruption. Many officials have been accused of abusing public offices for personal gains. Corrupt practices have resulted in inducing wrong decisions and projects, unqualified individuals being awarded contracts, delivery of sub-standard services and ultimately erosion of public confidence in public service and formal institutions. The impact includes the proliferation of slums with extremely high levels of human health hazards resulting in high infant mortality, low life expectancy and low quality of life. Such results seriously undermined the trustworthiness and creditworthiness of local governments.

The Municipal Development Programme has initiated a programme designed to assist local governments to strengthen their transparency and accountability in areas that directly or indirectly affect the lives of their residents. This initiative has its origin in the “Regional Workshop on Training of Trainers for the Development of Local Integrity System” that was held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe between August 17-22, 1997 under the auspices of the Municipal Development Programme and the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank. At the end of the Workshop, the Mayors of the City of Kwekwe and the Municipality of Marondera in Zimbabwe volunteered to test the service delivery surveys (SDS) concept, as a management tool, to communicate and dialogue with their residents particularly on those areas that are amenable to abuse of public trust. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) provided the funding for the survey and national workshop.

A mix of approaches and methods was applied in implementing this activity - establishing focal teams within councils, interviewing service beneficiaries and providers, organising consultative meetings at local levels, and holding a national workshop. The workshop which was attended by Mayors, Town Clerks, Directors of Housing from other municipalities, representatives of NGOs and CBOs and the donor community was held on May 17-19, 1998 and hosted by the Municipality of Marondera (**a list of participants is attached**). The same report was reported to a Regional Workshop that was held in Durban, South Africa from November 18 to 20, 1998 (**a list of participants is attached**). The purpose of the Durban event was, among others, to disseminate the experience of Kwekwe and Marondera.

The participants discussed the findings and exchanged ideas and experiences from their local perspectives. At the end, each local authority committed itself to an action plan designed to make governance more transparent and accountable. Public Relations Offices were given an added responsibility of acting as centres where complaints from the public could be lodged.

Important lessons are being learned through this initiative. It is now clear that the existence of political will as displayed by Executive Mayors Rex Mawere and Luke Mukungatu and their councillors, as well as the good working relationship between elected leaders and chief officers is key in ensuring the cooperation of the communities and success of the entire initiative. It is critical that communities are well sensitised to guarantee voluntary provision of information. The use of local consultants and community researchers is key in ensuring the cooperation of residents and respect for the findings. The initiative brings advantages to councils and related actors in various ways. It establishes channels for early identification of potential weaknesses in reform efforts. It empowers all the actors involved, opens up communication, establishes channels of dialogues and above all, it enhances trust and confidence in public officials. The use of local staff was a learning point for capacity building. The activity generates confidence and guarantees ownership and sustainability of the initiative. In terms of value for money, this activity has many ripple effects - good governance, transparency, poverty reduction, as well as addressing macroeconomic issues. With such interventions, residents can now ask intelligent questions. Politicians are equally empowered as this critical area

of management has been demystified. The MDP is pleased to be associated with the contents of this report. It is gratifying to see urban policy makers and managers taking firm steps to improve the trustworthiness of their councils.

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Regional Director

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The conduct of service delivery surveys is part of a programme initiated by the Municipal Development Programme (MDP)'s Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office to assist local authorities in the region to increase the transparency and accountability of their service provision. The programme is designed to tackle the problems of corruption, mismanagement and abuse of position, which are having a negative effect on both the financial viability and the public credibility of many local authorities in the region. It is supported by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the United Nations Development Programme's Programme on Accountability and Transparency (UNDP/PACT).

The concept of service delivery surveys (SDS) originated at a regional workshop on "Training of Trainers for the Development of Local Integrity System", which was held at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in August 1997, under the auspices of MDP and the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank. The surveys were conceived as a means by which local authorities could initiate a dialogue with local residents about the extent and nature of malpractice in service delivery and possible methods of dealing with the problem. At the end of the workshop, two local authorities in Zimbabwe, Kwekwe and Marondera, volunteered to test the approach.

1.2 THE SURVEY LOCATIONS

Kwekwe and Marondera are two of Zimbabwe's medium sized urban centres. In 1992 (when the last population census was undertaken), they ranked sixth and eleventh respectively in the urban hierarchy (Central Statistical Office, 1994).

Kwekwe had an estimated population of 120 000 at the time of the survey (1998). It is located in the Midlands Province, on the road and railway line midway between Harare and Bulawayo. Its economy is based on industry and mining and in 1998 it had the highest average per capita income in the country. In 1996 its local authority was upgraded from a municipality to a city council.

Marondera had an estimated population of about 70 000 in 1998. It is located 72 kilometres southeast of Harare, on the road and railway line to Mutare. It is primarily an administrative and market centre, and has since 1984 been the administrative capital of Mashonaland East Province. Its local authority has had the status of a municipality since 1974.

1.3 THE SURVEY METHODOLOGY

It was envisaged from the start that the surveys should cover a limited number of sectors, in order to simplify the process of data collection and enable detailed analysis to be made. It was eventually agreed to focus on housing

in both local authorities, since this is a particularly important local authority service, in which there are many opportunities for - and accusations of - malpractice.

The pilot surveys were undertaken simultaneously in the two urban centres over the period April-May 1998. The methodology, which was the same in both cases, involved a sample household survey, supplemented by focus group discussions and individual case studies. The surveys were preceded by public meetings, chaired by the Mayor and Regional Director of MDP, to inform people of the purpose and nature of the survey and encourage them to support the idea of constructive reforms. Following the pilot surveys, a national workshop was held in Harare on 21-22 May 1998, which was attended by representatives of a number of other Zimbabwean local authorities and other interested parties. At this workshop, the survey findings were presented and their implications and follow-up action were discussed.

The surveys were not conducted directly by the local authorities but by a private consultancy company, Systems Management Consultancy (SYMACON), assisted by teams of research assistants, who were recruited from the local community and given special training. This was considered necessary in order to encourage residents to respond honestly and without fear of reprisals. However, the local authorities were fully involved in all aspects of the design and management of the surveys and the overall exercise was co-ordinated by a project team, led by MDP and including representatives from the two local authorities, SYMACON and UNDP/PACT. Funding for the surveys, **including** the national workshop, was provided by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.

1.4 THE PRESENT REPORT

This report has two main objectives: firstly, to summarise the findings of the two pilot surveys and, secondly, to consider the potential of the SDS approach as a means of improving the transparency and accountability of local authority service provision. The rest of the report is divided into two sections, corresponding with these two objectives.

2.FINDINGS OF THE PILOT SURVEYS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This section of the report summarises and compares the findings of the two pilot surveys. It is based on two existing reports, one for each local authority, which were produced by SYMACON, on behalf of MDP and the two local authorities, in September 1998 (MDP/City of Kwekwe, 1998; MDP/Municipality of Marondera, 1998). The structure of this section is similar to that of the earlier reports. It comprises six sub-sections: selection of respondents; profile of respondents; experience of the housing delivery system; extent of complaint and redress; incidence of corruption; and recommendations.

2.2 SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

2.2.1 Sample Household Survey

The main source of information was a sample household survey. In order to ensure that the respondents included a representative mixture of high, medium and low density residents, a stratified random sampling system was used. Table 1 shows the number of households interviewed in each town and the proportion from each type of residential area.

Table 1: Sample Size

	Kwekwe	Marondera
Est. total no. households	16000	12000
No. interviewed	521	301
Residential area (%):		
high density	80	80
medium density	10	10
low density	10	10

2.2.2 Focus Group Discussions

The intention was to have focus group discussions in each type of residential area. This aim was achieved in Marondera, where four such discussions were held, **two** in high density areas and one each in medium and low density areas. A total of 29 people attended these discussions. In Kwekwe, however, it was only possible to hold one such discussion, which was held in a high density area and attended by 14 people. However, in-depth interviews, covering the same topics, were held with 12 additional people. The participants in these activities were a combination of those household survey respondents who were willing to attend and other interested people.

2.2.3 Case Studies

The third source of information was detailed accounts of individual experiences of malpractice in housing administration. These accounts were given by selected household survey respondents who had particularly interesting cases to relate. Three such cases were recorded in each town.

2.3 PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

2.3.1 Personal Data

In the sample household survey, interviews were held with the head of household or, if not available, the spouse. Table 2 summarises the basic personal data obtained about those who were interviewed. It suggests that the survey population has a relatively high rate of education and, in particular,

Table 2: Personal Data

		Kwekwe	Marondera
<u>Gender</u>	:		
	% male	41	31
	% female	59	69
<u>Age</u>	:range (years)	17-78	21-70
	mean (years)	37	37
<u>Education</u>	:% males primary	100	100
	% females primary	100	100
	% males secondary	72	87
	% females secondary	73	76
<u>Employment</u>	:% formal employment	66	63
	% informal employment	22	26
	% unemployed	11	11
<u>Income</u>	formal income male:		
	range (Z\$ p.m.)	10-40 000	100-17 000
	mean (Z\$ p.m.)	3 734	3 695
	% below poverty	46	44
	income		
	formal income female:		
	range (Z\$ p.m.)	80-10 000	1-10 000
	mean (Z\$ p.m.)	3 735	2 689
	% below poverty	51	58
	income		
	informal income:		
	range (Z\$)	10-25 000	100-7 000
	average (Z\$)	1532	91

formal employment in comparison to the population of the country as a whole. It appears that a substantial proportion of respondents were working wives, which in turn suggests that there are a significant number of households with two wage earners, or at least one wage earner and one informal sector worker. This is probably indicative of the relatively high

level of economic activity in the two towns. However, it should also be noted that in both towns approximately half of those formally employed were earning wages which are below the level calculated necessary to meet basic family needs. This is typical of the country as a whole and helps to explain why it is necessary to have more than one income earner in the household. In general, the data for the two towns are similar. However, both formal employment and formal incomes are somewhat higher in Kwekwe.

2.3.2 Housing Status

Table 3 summarises the information obtained about the housing status of the households who were interviewed. Five main points emerge from this data:

Table 3: Housing Status

		Kwekwe	Marondera
<u>Density:</u>	no. households per stand:		
	range	1-10	1-11
	mean	1.63	1.94
<u>Ownership</u>	:		
	% householders	52	64
	% lodgers	41	35
	% undefined	6	1
<u>Length of ownership</u>	:		
	% owners allocated		
	house or stand:		
	pre-1976	6	8
	1976-80	6	14
	1981-85	12	14
	1986-90	14	22
1991-95	29	29	
1996-98	25	12	
<u>Length of rental:</u>	% lodgers renting:		
	at least 7 years	12	27
	7 years or less	88	73

1. There is obviously a housing shortage in both towns, since stands intended to house one household were accommodating up to ten or eleven households, with an average of 1.63 in Kwekwe and 1.94 in Marondera.

2. In both towns, over half those interviewed were householders, although the proportion was considerably higher in Kwekwe than in Marondera. The term "householder" is used here to include those renting or renting-to-buy houses from the local authority as well as those with full ownership rights. The remainder were "lodgers"; that is, they were renting from a private individual.

3. In both places, approximately two-thirds of householders had obtained their houses or stands in the period since 1985. Although this is probably partly a reflection of the relatively young average age of the respondents, it also suggests that the provision of houses and stands has increased over this period. In Kwekwe there appears to have been a marked increase in provision in the 1990s, which is the period of economic structural adjustment (ESAP), in which private sector involvement in the housing sector has been encouraged. However, in Marondera the expansion appears to have started earlier and to have tailed off somewhat in the latter part of the 1990s.

4. The remaining households were lodgers. In both towns, the vast majority of lodgers had been renting for no more than seven years. This is probably primarily a reflection of their relatively young age.

5. The substantial number of relatively recent householders in both survey areas ensured that there were adequate respondents with recent personal experience of the process of acquiring a house or stand.

2.4 EXPERIENCE OF THE HOUSING DELIVERY SYSTEM

2.4.1 Use of Waitlist

The allocation of houses and stands by local authorities is supposed to be done on the basis of a waitlist. Those requiring a house or stand are required to make a written application, which should be renewed annually. Their names are then put on the waitlist and houses or stands are allocated in order of the priority on the waitlist.

Both Kwekwe and Marondera maintain wait lists. However, Table 4 indicates that in both local authority areas a significant proportion of those allocated houses or stands by-passed the waitlist. The number appears to be particularly high in Kwekwe, where 31% of householder respondents had not been on the waitlist. Some of these cases no doubt have valid explanations. For example, in Marondera the Municipality pointed out that some people on the waitlist are either unable (because of financial constraints) or unwilling to take the type of houses or stands offered. Furthermore, national government policy requires that local authorities give preference to certain categories of person, such as expatriates, ex-combatants, medical personnel and the disabled. However, it seems unlikely that such explanations can account for all the cases where the waitlist was bypassed.

Table 4: Use of Waitlist

	Kwekwe	Marondera
No. owning house/stand	272	184
% waitlisted	69	87
% not waitlisted	31	13

2.4.2 Period of Waiting

Table 5 summarises the data obtained on the length of time which those who were allocated a house or stand had to wait; that is, the time between being put on the waitlist (or, in the case of those not waitlisted, making the initial approach) and the time of allocation. The main conclusion which emerges from this data is that the average period of waiting- was not unexpectedly long (five years in Kwekwe and three and a half years in Marondera) but the variation was very high - from less than a year to 21 years in Kwekwe and 18 years in Marondera. This again suggests that factors other than position on the waitlist were influencing the allocation process, which in turn implies the likelihood of some form of

malpractice.

Table 5: Waiting Period

No. years those acquiring house or stand had to wait	Kwekwe	Marondera
Range	0-21	0-18
Mean	5.0	3.5

2.4.3 Assistance by Officials

Householders were asked which (if any) officials they first approached personally when seeking to obtain a house or stand and which of these contributed most to their acquisition thereof. They were also asked what sort of assistance they received from these officials. Their responses are summarised in Tables 6 and 7 below.

The data presented in Tables 6 and 7 must be treated with caution, since it appears likely that many respondents did not divulge the fact that they had received assistance. The most obvious indicator of this is that in both towns over 80% of those respondents who had not been on the waitlist said that no-one had contributed to their success in acquiring a house or stand, while in both cases a substantial proportion (61% in Kwekwe and 48% in Marondera) said that they had not even approached anyone (Table 6). This is obviously impossible, since someone must have helped them to bypass the wait list system. Similarly, many of those on the waitlist said that they had initially approached someone but that no-one had actually contributed to their acquisition (Table 6), while a large majority of all respondents (83% in Kwekwe and 61% in Marondera) denied receiving any form of assistance at all (Table 7). Furthermore, the only form of assistance mentioned by a significant number of people was help in getting on the waitlist, which is a relatively harmless form of assistance. These assertions may, of course, be true, but it seems unlikely.

The likelihood that many people did not respond honestly is supported by the fact that many people were reluctant to answer these questions and by the supplementary information obtained from the focus group discussions and case studies. The general impression gained from the latter sources is that the waitlist was often by-passed and that it was very difficult to get a house or stand if one did not have some personal contact who could "pull a few strings". The wider implications of these methodological problems will be discussed in the final section of the report. Nevertheless, the data from the **household** surveys does give an indication of those individuals who were considered to be most influential in the housing allocation process - and, therefore, most susceptible to corruption or other forms of abuse of position. It appears that the key people were those directly involved in the housing allocation process, notably the Head of Housing, Superintendent of Housing and Housing Officer. However, the relative importance of these officials differed in the two local authorities, presumably as a result of differences in personality among the individuals involved. An important point to note is, perhaps, the fact that council staff appeared to be far more influential than politicians (i.e. councillors or the mayor).

Table 6: Officials Who Provided Assistance

Official	Role	% Respondents		Mentioning Marondera	
		Kwekwe Wait- listed	Not wait- listed	Wait- listed	Not wait- li
Mayor	First approached	0.2	0	0	0
	Contributed most	0.2	0	4.0	0
Town Clerk	First approached	0.4	2.0	0	0
	Contributed most	0	0	0	0
Head of Housing	First approached	5.0	3.0	40.0	8.0
	Contributed most	1.4	2.0	28.0	12.0
Supt. of Housing	First approached	23.0	9.0	9.0	20.0
	Contributed most	6.0	3.4	3.0	4.0
Housing Officer	First approached	43.0	20.0	36.0	16.0
	Contributed most	7.6	3.4	9.0	0
Area Councillor	First approached	0.2	0	0.7	0
	Contributed most	0.9	0	1.4	0
Other	First approached	4.0	5.0	2.1	4.0
	Contributed most	3.7	0	4.4	0
No-one	First approached	24.0	61.0	13.8	48.0
	Contributed most	80.4	86.0	54.0	84.0

Table 7: Type of Assistance Provided

Type of assistance	% respondents Kwekwe	mentioning Marondera
Helped to get on waitlist	16.0	30.0
Introduced to official	1.5	7.0
Helped to jump queue	0.4	2.0
No assistance	82.5	61.0

2.4.4 Extent of Contact with Local Authority

Those who had acquired houses or stands were questioned about the number of visits they had made to the local authority offices in the process of so doing and the number of people they had seen there. Two main findings emerge from their responses, which are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8: Visits to Local Authority

		Kwekwe		Marondera	
		Total	Those not Waitlisted	Total	Those not waitlisted
No. visits:	Range	1-96	1-20	1-99	1-20
	Mean	10	3	15	5
No. people seen:	Range	1-25	2-4	1-10	2-4
	Mean	4	4	6	4

Firstly, both the number of visits required and the number of people seen were, in general, very high. For example, applicants made up to 99 visits in Marondera and saw up to 25 different people in Kwekwe. This suggests bureaucratic inefficiency within both local authorities. This is supported by the fact that, when asked why they had to see so many people, the majority of respondents (54% in Kwekwe and 75% in Marondera), cited procedural reasons, the most common one being that the person they wanted to see was not available.

Secondly, in both local authority areas there was an enormous variation in the number of visits made and the number of people seen, with those who were not on the waitlist making noticeably fewer visits and seeing fewer people. This suggests that there was no one set of procedures for acquiring a house or stand and that the procedures were significantly simpler for those who were able to "short cut" the system. In order to explore the possibility of corruption further, respondents were asked whether they were ever specifically told not to see any other official. The number who said that they were is small (2% in Kwekwe and 9% in Marondera), but nevertheless significant in view of the earlier observation that people normally have to see several different people.

2.4.5 Quality of Service Provided by Local Authority Staff

Respondents were asked a variety of questions about the quality of the service provided by council staff. Some of these questions were addressed only to those who had had some contact with the local authority, others to all respondents. Their responses are summarised in Table 9 below.

It is not easy to draw any clear conclusions from this data. On the one hand, a substantial majority of those who had had contact with the council (64% in Kwekwe and 72% in Marondera) said they were satisfied with the service they received. However, the replies to more detailed questions indicate a more

Table 9: Quality of Service

	% of Respondents	
	Kwekwe	Marondera
<u>Satisfaction with service (1):</u>		
Satisfied	64	72
not satisfied	36	28
reasons why not satisfied:		
unclear procedures	63	49
negative attitude	48	52
Ignorance of role	36	33
poor record keeping	38	34
Corruption	52	51
<u>Quality-of information given (1):</u>		
Clear	56	53
Inadequate	26	34
Misleading	2	6
Confusing	9	4
referred elsewhere	5	2
no information	3	1
<u>Attitude of staff:</u>		
polite (1)	40	38
helpful (1)	33	29
rude (1)	8	6
ignorant (1)	5	6
Unconcerned (1)	13	18
Favouritism (1)	0	2
efficient (2)-	51	36
Knowledgeable (2)	70	41
keen to serve (9-)	65	37
Courteous (2)	62	32

(1)All those respondents who had had contact with council (including those not allocated house or stand).

(2)All respondents.

complex picture. Although relatively few respondents expressed negative opinions (e.g. complained of inadequate, confusing or misleading information, or rude, ignorant or unconcerned staff), positive

comments were also less forthcoming than the overall level of satisfaction would suggest. For example, only just over half (56% in Kwekwe and 53% in Marondera) thought the information given to them was clear, and considerably less than half thought that council staff were polite (40% in Kwekwe and 38% in Marondera) or helpful (33% in Kwekwe and 29% in Marondera). Furthermore, although no-one in Kwekwe and only 2% of respondents in Marondera accused council staff of favouritism, 19% and 14% respectively (i.e. 51% and 51% of those not satisfied with the service they received) mentioned corruption as a reason for their lack of satisfaction.

The situation is further complicated when the data for all respondents is considered. In this case, there is a marked difference between the two local authority areas. In Kwekwe, the majority of respondents said that council staff were efficient, knowledgeable, keen to serve and courteous, while in Marondera a minority were of this opinion. This suggests that the general "hearsay" opinion of council staff was higher in Kwekwe than in Marondera, but that in Kwekwe people's opinions were lowered when they had direct experience of council services. In general, however, it is not possible to conclude from this data that either local authority had a better reputation than the other.

There are two possible reasons for these apparent inconsistencies. One is that people have low expectations of local authority performance and/or fail to realise that they have a right to demand good service from them. Consequently, there is a relatively high rate of satisfaction, especially among those who eventually obtained a house or stand. This is discussed further in section 5 below. The other is that cultural norms, which discourage public criticism of others, make people reluctant to comment negatively in such situations. Whatever the reason, the findings demonstrate the problems of obtaining accurate information on people's attitudes, especially their attitudes to other people's behaviour or performance. The implications of this will be considered in the concluding section of the report.

2.5 EXTENT OF COMPLAINT AND REDRESS

2.5.1 Extent and Nature of Complaints

54% of all respondents in Kwekwe and 37% in Marondera had a complaint about their local authority's housing delivery system. These figures are surprisingly low, given the general backlog of housing provision in both areas and the problems of the housing delivery service identified in section 2.4. Like the data in section 2.4.5, they suggest that people have a low level of expectation and do not realise that they have a civic right - and responsibility - to demand good services from their local authorities.

Table 10 indicates the main types of complaint mentioned by those who did express their dissatisfaction. The situation is similar in both towns. The main complaints were the slow provision and therefore insufficient supply of houses and stands, the high prices thereof (including high rates and rental charges), and the incidence of malpractice (notably failure to use the waitlist and houses or stands given to non-residents). Complaints about the quality of houses and stands were also mentioned, but were of lower priority.

Table 10: Types of Complaint

Type of Complaint	% respondents Kwekwe	mentioning Marondera
Slow provision/lack of houses/stands	36	25
Purchase prices/rates/rents too high	19	23
Waitlist ignored/by-passed	12	14
Houses/stands given to non-residents	11	17
Stands/houses too small	5	3
Houses old/dilapidated	4	7

2.5.2 Action Taken by Complainant

In both towns, only 35% of those who made complaints about the housing delivery service (that is, 19% of total respondents in Kwekwe and 13% in Marondera) had voiced their complaints to the local authority. All respondents who had not complained (including those who had not actually expressed dissatisfaction) were asked why they had not done so. The main reasons given were that they did not know how to do so (26% in Kwekwe and 59% in Marondera) and that it was a waste of time (34% in Kwekwe and 17% in Marondera). This again suggests a lack of knowledge about civic rights and responsibilities, and/or a reluctance to exercise such rights. However, it probably also reflects the local authorities' failure to respond to many complaints - a point that is discussed in section 2.5.3 below. Very few people appeared to be afraid either that they would be victimised or that someone would be fired as a result of their action.

Table 11 indicates to whom the few who did complain to the local authority made their complaints. As in the case of the initial approach to the authority (see Table 6 above), the Head of Housing, Superintendent of Housing and Housing Officer were among the main persons approached, and again the relative importance was different in the two towns. However, in this case, a significant number of complaints were also made, in both towns, to the local councillor and, in Marondera, to the Mayor. Only just over a third of complaints (34% in Kwekwe and 40% in Marondera) were made directly to the person about whom the complaint was made. This probably reflects a cultural reluctance to confront people directly.

Table 11: People to Whom Complaints Made

Person to Whom Complained	% of Those Making Kwekwe	Complaints Marondera
Mayor	6	15
Town Clerk	4	3
Head of Housing	17	39
Superintendent of Housing	28	0
Housing Officer	22	15
Worker	3	3
Area Councillor	19	24

2.5.3 Response to Complaints by Local Authority

Table 12 shows the response which complainants received from the local authority. The main conclusion which emerges from this table is that in a large number of cases no action was taken and only in a minority of cases was the problem solved. However, there are noticeable, but inconsistent, differences between the two local authorities. The number of cases where no action was taken was much lower (32%) in Kwekwe than in Marondera (64%), but the number of cases where the problem was solved was also much lower (6% as opposed to 27%). The implication is that Kwekwe was more likely to take action than Marondera, but less likely to solve the problem. Since this seems somewhat odd, the difference could be explained by differences in the way in which the questions were phrased in the two towns.

The table also indicates that in a small but significant number of cases fairly drastic action, notably the dismissal of the person responsible or the allocation of a house or stand to the complainant, was taken. Some cases of the latter were documented in the case studies. However, it also shows that some complainants were merely referred to someone else, while others were shunned and never attended to again.

Table 12: Response to Complaints

Action	% of Complaints	
	Kwekwe	Marondera
No action	32	64
Problem solved	6	27
Person responsible dismissed	0.4	3
Complainant allocated house	0.4	3
Complainant referred elsewhere	0	3
Complainant shunned	3	6

2.6 INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION

2.6.1 Definition of Corruption

Since the term "corruption" is somewhat vague, respondents were asked what activities they considered to be "corrupt". The responses, which are summarised in Table 13 below, were similar in the two towns. In both places, the vast majority of respondents considered that asking for extra payment constitutes corruption, while a majority felt that not adhering to council policies (e.g. not using the waitlist) and "unequal" (presumably meaning unfair) distribution of houses or stands are forms of corruption, and a minority considered that accepting gifts after giving a service is corrupt. It should, however, be noted that the proportion of respondents who defined an activity as corrupt was in all cases higher in Kwekwe than in Marondera. Furthermore, in no case did all respondents regard an activity as corrupt. This suggests a varied and, particularly in Marondera, generally relatively narrow definition of corruption.

Table 13: Definition of Corruption

Activity	Respondents Defining % respondents Kwekwe	Activity as Corruption Marondera
	Asking for extra payment	90
Not adhering to Council policies	83	66
Unequal distribution of stands/houses	75	55
Accepting gifts after giving service	56	29

2.6.2 Corruption in Allocation of Houses and Stands

Questions about corruption were spaced throughout the interview, since it was feared that respondents might be reluctant to answer a set of consecutive questions on such a sensitive topic. Therefore, respondents were asked whether there was corruption in the allocation of houses and stands on two different occasions. On the first occasion, the question was asked as part of the discussion on people's complaints about the housing delivery service (see section 2.5 above), while on the second occasion, it was asked after the question about the definition of corruption (see section 2.6.1). The responses, desegregated by type of residential area, are presented in Table 14.

Table 14: Corruption in Allocation of Houses and Stands

Occasion when asked	% of Respondents Who Said that Corruption Exists							
	Kwekwe				Marondera			
	High	Medium	Low	Total	High	Medium	Low	Total
First	50	50	16	47	42	67	26	43
Second	71	82	46	69	68	75	71	69

The most obvious point which emerges from Table 14 is that there is a significant difference between the responses on the first occasion and those on the second. This could mean either that people were not giving honest answers or that their views were affected by the context in which the question was asked. The fact that, in all cases, respondents indicated a significantly higher level of corruption on the second occasion suggests that the latter explanation is the most probable. It seems like that, on the first occasion, respondents interpreted corruption to mean payment of extra money to receive a house or stand, while on the second occasion, after the discussion on the possible forms which corruption may take, they adopted a broader definition.

Assuming that the above explanation is correct, two main conclusions emerge from the data. Firstly, in both Kwekwe and Marondera just under one half of respondents thought that some people pay extra money to receive a house or stand, while just over two thirds thought that there is corruption in a broader sense. Secondly, there was considerable variation between residential areas, with a tendency for those in medium density areas to suggest the highest levels of corruption and those in low density areas (with the exception of Marondera on the second occasion when the question was asked) the lowest. This difference could be explained by variation in the degree of exposure to local authority housing services; for example, in low density areas, houses and stands are often obtained through the private sector (e.g. building societies) rather than the local authority.

On the first occasion that the question was posed, respondents were also asked why the general public provokes

or supports corruption and what effect it has on service provision. The two main reasons given were that it speeds up the allocation process (mentioned by 46% of respondents in Kwekwe and 42% in Marondera) and that it "motivates staff" (mentioned by 41% in Kwekwe and 30% in Marondera). In terms of the impact on service provision, at least three quarters of respondents in both towns suggested that it increases the costs of services and (therefore) "makes people poorer". The nature of these responses supports the earlier assumption that, on this occasion, corruption was interpreted to mean the payment of extra money.

Following the second discussion on corruption in the allocation of houses and stands, respondents were asked what should be done to tackle the problem. Their suggestions are presented in Table 15. In both towns, the most common suggestions were to adhere to council policy and to take legal action those council employees involved. However, these were closely followed in importance by a variety of measures designed to monitor or expose corruption.

Table 15: Measures to Prevent Corruption in Allocation

Measure	% respondents Kwekwe	Suggesting Marondera
Adhere to Council policy	86	65
Take legal action against offender-	77	64
Involve residents in monitoring	73	52
Expose corruption	66	55
Encourage reporting of corruption	65	59

The information on corruption from the questionnaire survey was reinforced by that from the focus group discussions and case studies. The general impression gained was that, in most people's opinion, there was a high level of corruption. Frequent mention was made of houses or stands being given to council staff or their friends and relatives, and to people from outside the town (especially from Harare) who can afford to pay bribes. The case studies recorded specific examples of malpractice, including people paying money to get a house or stand, houses being "sold" several times over by council staff, and complainants being given a house or stand to prevent them from disclosing information about malpractice. There was even one case where someone obtained a stand by pretending to be a minister and telephoning the housing official, instructing him to allocate the stand to his "friend".

Participants in the focus group discussions suggested that council officials engaged in such activities for a variety of reasons, including to "get rich", return favours and exert power, and also because the incidence of corruption in the country is now so high that there is a "culture of corruption". Suggestions for dealing with the problem included rotating staff in the housing office, the establishment of independent housing schemes not involving the local authority, and monitoring by the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing.

2.6.3 Corruption in Employment and Promotion of Staff

After the discussion on the definition of corruption, respondents were also asked whether there is corruption in the employment and promotion of staff in their local authority and, if so, what should be done to prevent it. The responses are summarised in Tables 16 and 17 below.

Table 16: Corruption in Employment and Promotion of Staff

Response	% respondents Kwekwe	Marondera
Corruption exists	40	51
Corruption does not exist	35	35
Don't know	25	14

Table 17: Measures to Prevent Corruption in Staffing

Measure	% respondents Kwekwe	Suggesting Marondera
improve supervision	84	74
Train staff	77	60
Appoint qualified staff	70	61

In both towns, only 35% of respondents said that there was no corruption, but not all of the remainder thought that there was, since a considerable proportion of respondents (25% in Kwekwe and 14% in Marondera) said that they did not know. The most commonly mentioned solution to the problem was, in both cases, to improve supervision. Other suggestions were to train staff and to appoint qualified staff.

2.6.4 Susceptibility to Corruption

Respondents were asked which local authority officials are most susceptible to corruption. The responses are summarised in Table 18. The responses were similar in the two towns, with the Head of Housing and Housing Officer generally being considered the most susceptible. The main differences were, firstly, the Superintendent of Housing was considered more susceptible in Kwekwe than in Marondera and, secondly, the general level of susceptibility was considered to be higher in Marondera than in Kwekwe.

Table 18: Susceptibility to Corruption

Official	% respondents Kwekwe	% respondents Marondera
Head of Housing	45	61
Housing Officer	44	48
Town Clerk	21	15
Executive Mayor	21	15
Superintendent of Housing	21	11
Worker/Operative	14	13
Area Councillor	11	11
Party Official	5	6
Other Councillor	4	6
Local MP	4	5
Provincial Governor	4	5

2.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

2.7.1 Respondents' Recommendations

Respondents were asked to suggest ways of improving the housing delivery service. Their proposals, which are summarised in Table 19, were wide-ranging reflecting the fact that they were concerned not only about the way in which houses and stands were allocated (which was the main focus of the survey), but also about the overall shortage of housing provision and its cost and, to a lesser extent, its quality.

Although there was some variation between the two towns, the most commonly made suggestions were to follow the waitlist, provide more houses and provide cheaper houses. In terms of the objectives of the survey, the first of these is the most relevant. Less frequently mentioned suggestions of direct relevance to the survey included measures to make the allocation process more equitable (fairness, no favouritism, transparency in the allocation process and adhering to policies), to improve staff performance (better supervision and appointment of professional staff), and to increase public involvement (consultative meetings and suggestion boxes).

Table 19: Suggestions for Improving Housing Delivery

Suggestion	% respondents Kwekwe	Suggesting Marondera
Build more houses	15	
Follow waiting list	14	
Build cheaper houses	11	
No favouritism	9	
Strict supervision	6	
Consultative meetings	6	
Fairness	6	
Allocate by income	4	
Punish corruption	4	
More professional staff	4	
Adhere to policies	3	
More housing schemes	2	
Speed up delivery	2	
Increase transparency	1	
Suggestion boxes	1	
Larger stands	1	
Don't know	6	

2.7.2 General Recommendations

The following - general recommendations emerged from the SDS findings and were presented in the initial survey reports (MDP-/City of Kwekwe, 1998, MDP, Municipality of Marondera, 1998):

1. Public awareness campaigns should be organised to inform People how to make complaints to, and communicate with, councillor and staff.
2. Housing policies should take account of the low income,-, of most urban residents and local authorities should provide a conducive environment for informal sector activities in order to increase local incomes.
3. Efforts should be made to reduce the gap between supply and demand in housing provision, with the aim now of providing housing for all by the year 2020.
4. The administration of the housing waitlist should be improved. In particular:
 - (i.)The system of internal controls should be reviewed and strengthened at senior levels (i.e. those of the Head of Housing, Housing Superintendent and Housing Officer).
 - (ii.)There should be more transparency in the allocation process.
 - (iii.)The waitlist should be a public document, which is published regularly on council notice boards. (iv) A copy of the waitlist should be provided to the audit section of what was then the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing (now part of the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing) and used in the compilation of the Ministry's annual audit reports.
5. Area councillors should be the point of contact for people requiring information on progress in administering housing development programmes.

6. Local authorities should introduce a "one-stop shop" approach to service delivery, so that clients do not have to be referred to many different people.
7. Cases of corruption within local authorities should be treated as criminal offences (and therefore referred to the police in terms of the Prevention of Corruption Act), not as internal disciplinary matters.
8. Local authorities should take note of, and act upon, the recommendations for improving housing service delivery made by residents (see Table 19 above).
9. Local authorities should "review the policies and procedures" of those officials most susceptible to corruption, notably the Head of Housing, Superintendent, Housing Officer, Town Clerk and Executive Mayor.

3. THE POTENTIAL OF THE SDS APPROACH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The final section of this report looks briefly at the potential of the SDS approach as a means of improving the transparency and accountability of local authority service provision. It is divided into two subsections. The first (section 3.2) describes what has been done, in Kwekwe and Marondera and elsewhere in Zimbabwe, as a result of the two pilot surveys, while the second (section 3.3) considers the methodological lessons that can be learned from the pilot surveys.

3.2 IMPACT OF THE PILOT SURVEYS

Since this report is being written little more than a year after the surveys were conducted, it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions regarding their impact - and, therefore, the long-term potential of the SDS approach. Nevertheless, some indication of its potential can be gained by a brief review of what has been achieved to date.

The main achievements may be summarised as follows:

1. As already indicated in section 1.3, the findings of the pilot surveys were presented at a national workshop, which was held in Harare on 21-22 May 1998 and attended by representatives of other urban local authorities in Zimbabwe, central government agencies and international organisations. A copy of the workshop programme and list of participants is attached as Appendix 1. Particularly significant was the fact that the two pilot local authorities, the City of Kwekwe and Municipality of Marondera, played the lead role in the proceedings, thereby affirming their "ownership" of the survey findings. The workshop stimulated a lively discussion and concluded with the preparation of action plans, not only for Kwekwe and Marondera but also for the other local authorities present.
2. Following the workshop, both Kwekwe and Marondera have made progress in implementing their action plans. For example, both authorities have initiated performance management audits, which are being undertaken with assistance from the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management (ZIPAM), while Marondera has already made substantial changes in its housing delivery service, including making waitlists available to the general public, publishing a handbook on council procedures and appointing a community liaison officer.
3. A number of other urban local authorities in Zimbabwe have expressed their intention to undertake similar surveys. They include (Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Kadoma, Kariba, Gweru and Masvingo).
4. These activities all suggest that the pilot studies have stimulated a positive process of reflection and reaction, both in Kwekwe and Marondera and elsewhere, and that there is a genuine commitment within urban local authorities to improve their transparency and accountability.

3.3 THE SDS METHODOLOGY

It has already been suggested in section 3.1 - that the SDS approach appears to be proving its worth as a methodological technique for beginning to tackle the problems of corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power in local authorities. This section looks in more detail at the lessons that can be learned from the two pilot surveys about the methodology itself. It looks, first,

at the critical components of the approach which have contributed to its apparent success and, second, at problems encountered in the surveys and possible ways in which these can be overcome. These lessons are particularly important for those local authorities who are planning to undertake similar surveys in their own areas in the future.

The success of the SDS approach can probably be attributed to three main factors:

1. There was a strong commitment to the exercise within the two local authorities, and at the highest level therein. This was reflected in the fact that they volunteered to test the methodology, in their initial publicisation of the surveys, in the logistical support they provided during the surveys, and in their leading role in the subsequent national workshop. Without such commitment, there would have been little chance of any significant follow-up action.
2. There was extensive consultation with local residents. In fact, such consultation constituted the core of the surveys. This was necessary not only to find out about the extent and nature of malpractice but also to increase people's awareness of their civic rights and responsibilities. If the general public is aware that it has both the right to receive good services from its local authority and the responsibility to take action if it is not satisfied with the quality of service provision, local authorities are forced to become more transparent and accountable.
3. The surveys focussed on a critical form of service delivery - that of housing, where demand exceeds supply and there is therefore inevitably a high risk of malpractice. This ensured that the surveys not only generated adequate relevant information but also were seen to be addressing a problem about which the general public feels very strongly.
4. The surveys were undertaken by independent researchers. This was necessary in order to encourage respondents to speak openly and honestly about their experiences in service delivery, without fear of reprisal.

However, there were, inevitably also some problems associated with the surveys. The three main problems were:

1. It proved difficult to get honest answers to questions about malpractices in service delivery, particularly (but not only) from those who had benefited therefrom. This is inevitably a problem when dealing- with such sensitive issues, especially in a society where it is "not done" to criticise individuals directly or publicly. Moreover, it probably exacerbated by the fact that, even though the surveys were conducted by independent interviewers, it was - necessarily - known that the was being undertaken in conjunction with the local authority.
2. Many of the suggestions which respondents made for tackling the problems were superficial and/or unrealistic. This is also a predictable problem, since most respondents lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of *local* authority procedures and constraints to make more informed suggestions.
3. The surveys were relatively expensive to conduct, due to the large amounts of time and manpower required for both the collection and processing of data in household surveys. This was not a problem in the pilot surveys, since funding was provided by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. However, it could be an obstacle to other local authorities who do

not have access to external funding.

These three problems suggest the need to review the survey methodology if or when subsequent surveys are conducted. There is, in particular, a need to consider using focus group discussions, supplemented where possible by individual case studies, rather than a conventional household survey. It was apparent in the pilot surveys that people were more willing to talk about problems of corruption in group discussions than in individual interviews. Moreover, such discussions can, if they are properly planned and sufficient time is allocated, be used as a means of imparting information on the way in which councils operate, thereby not only facilitating a more in-depth discussion of possible solutions to the problems identified but also contributing to the process of civic education. Furthermore, they are far less expensive in terms of both the collection and processing of data.

The main advantage of household surveys is the potential for large quantity of accurate quantitative data which can be subjected to statistical analysis. But it is obvious from the survey findings that the accuracy of the data obtained on key issues related to malpractice contained many inaccuracies. Furthermore, in this context, the main aim is not to collect accurate quantitative data but to find out how people perceive the situation and stimulate a dialogue between service providers and their clients. It is therefore recommended that future survey seriously consider this methodological change.

3.4 CONCLUSION

The pilot surveys in Kwekwe and Marondera suggest that there is considerable potential for using the SDS approach as a means of addressing the problems of malpractice in local authorities. It remains to be seen whether this will actually bring about significant and long-term improvements in their administration. The biggest obstacle to such improvement is probably the macro-economic situation in the country and the related problem of the increasingly pervasive "culture of corruption". However, this reinforces the importance of the SDS approach, which is designed not merely to provide information on malpractice but to challenge the underlying culture of corruption. The main strength of the SDS methodology is that it addresses both ends of the problem: the behaviour of local authorities and of the general public. It is precisely - and only - through such an approach that this culture can be changed.

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MDP/Municipality of Marondera, 1998. Improving Services Delivery in Local Authorities: The Case of Strengthening Accountability and Transparency in Housing Delivery in the Municipality of Marondera, Zimbabwe. Harare, in association with Federation of Canadian Municipalities and UNDP/PACT.

APPENDIX 1

NATIONAL WORKSHOP 21-22 MAY 1998

**THE MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME EASTERN AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
PROGRAM ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN ASSOCIATION WITH
THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MARONDERA AND THE CITY OF KWEKWE**

Present a

**National Workshop on Establishing Local Integrity Systems in Local Government in
Zimbabwe May 21-22, 1998 at Marondera Hotel**

Workshop Agenda

Wednesday May	20Arrival at Marondera Hotel and Registration
Thursday May 21	
08:30- 09:00	Guests Arrive
09:00- 09:45	Official Opening Welcome remarks by Executive Mayor of Marondera, Honourable Luke
Mukungatu	Remarks by Regional Director of MDP Mr. George Matovu Remarks by the Secretary General of JULA-AS, Mr. Charles Katiza Remarks by the representative of the World Bank, Ms. Collen Butcher Remarks by the UNDP representative Dr. Kjeld Eikjaer Remarks by the Governor and Resident Minister Honourable David Karimanzira Opening Statement by the Deputy Minister Local Government and National Housing, Alderman Tonny Gara
09:45-10:00	Objective and Format of the Workshop
10:00 - 11:00	Presentation of the Study Methodology and Conduct of the Survey including 1 5 minutes of Plenary Discussions and
Questions	Presenter: Mr. Simon Matsvai Chairperson: The Town Clerk of Marondera Mr Musuwo
11:00-11:30	Tea/Coffee Break
11:30-1 2:30	Presentation on the findings of the Study (City of Kwekwe and Municipality of Marondera) including 15 minutes of Plenary Discussions and Questions Presenter: Mr. Simon Matsvai Chairperson: The Executive Mayor of Gweru Honourable Bwerazuva

12:30-14:00	Lunch
14:00-14:15	The Victoria Falls Charter for Building Integrity in Local Government Administration in Eastern and Southern Africa Presenter: Mr. George Matovu - MDP
14:15-14:45	A cross-country Comparison of Local Integrity System Cases of Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Malawi, and Mauritius Presenter: Dr. Sahr Kpundeh - EDJ Consultant
14:45-15:00	Tools of Enhancing Local Integrity System: Value for money participatory budgeting, Ombudsman declaration and monitoring of assets Presenter: Mr. Kjeld Elkjaer - UNDP
	Chairperson afternoon session: Town Clerk of Bulawayo Dr. Michael Ndubiwa
15:00-15:15	Tea/Coffee Break
15:15-17:00	Group Discussions
Friday May 22	
08:00-10:00	Group Presentations and Discussions Chairperson: Director of Housing Masvingo Mr. Mudekunye
10:00-10:30	Tea/Coffee Break
10:30-11:30	Preparation of Action Plan and the way forward for: *Municipality of Marondera ❖ City of Kwekwe ❖ Other Local Authorities ❖ Regional Workshop Facilitator: Dr. Sahr. Kpunde EDI Consultant
11:30-12:30	Workshop Evaluation
12:30 -13:00	Closing
13:00	Lunch and Departure.

**List of Participants to the
National Workshop in Marondera**

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