

**Belo Horizonte, Brazil**

# Participatory Budgeting step-by-step guideline

justification and contextual analysis for insertion of  
the program in African cities

**Consultancy report**

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2009

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# Participatory Budgeting step-by-step guideline

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**CONSULTANCY REPORT**

## 1. GENERAL OVERVIEW

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a participatory politic at the local level that deals with demands from less favored sectors of the population for more justice in the distribution of public goods in Brazilian cities (Avritzer, 2002a; Wampler, 2003; Wampler and Avritzer, 2005; Sintomer, 2005). It includes social actors, neighborhood associations' members, and common citizens in a process of negotiation and deliberation that occurs in two steps: a first one in which there is a direct participation and takes place in the interior of regional assemblies; and a second one, in which participation occurs through the constitution of a Council or forum of delegates.

PB emerged in Porto Alegre in 1990 and got consolidated in several Brazilian cities, among which Belo Horizonte, from 1993 on. By the year 2000, the program became one of the most relevant participatory experiences in democratic Brazil, whether we think on its political impact in the country, as well as in other countries. Despite being initially associated to PT administrations, PB has expanded to many reference administrations and, since 1997, the number of experiences linked to PT decreased to 43% of the total of PB experiences belonged to a more general field of leftist parties. In 2008, there were in Brazil 192 PB experiments linked to several parties. It is possible to assert that PB has shown a distributive politic with great penetration power in Brazilian, Latin American, and, more recently, African municipalities.

Notwithstanding, in order to analyze this penetrative potential, it is necessary to bear in mind two different phenomena: the characteristics of the successful experiments in Brazil and the difference between Brazilian

cities in which PB is successful and the African cities in which the program is supposed to be implemented. This report is divided in three parts. In the first one, we will differentiate socioeconomic conditions of Brazil from the socioeconomic conditions of the African countries intended to implement PB. In the second part, it is made a systematization of the characteristic of 11 Brazilian cities considered as PB successful cases, belonged to the PB Brazilian web. In the last part, we make an analysis of the possibilities of extension of some of those Brazilian experiments elements to Africa.

## **2. COMPARING URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PB**

Participatory Budgeting is a public political program that has shown useful to ameliorate the access of low income population to public goods. This characteristic is what has made the program known in cities such as Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. Both were capable to ameliorate the access of the poorest to urban infrastructure.

In order to think, then, in what way should PB be implemented in African countries, it is important to compare data from Brazil and data from African regions, as done in table 1 below:

**Table 1**  
Comparison of socio-demographic data between the countries

	South Africa	Madagascar	Cameroon	Mozambique	Brazil
Human development index value	0.674	0.533	0.532	0.384	0.800
Human Poverty Index	23.5	35.8	31.8	50.6	9.7
Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40	31.7	24.4	35.7	45.0	9
Population not using an improved water source	12	50	34	57	10
Population, annual growth rate	2.1	2.9	2.7	2.2	
Population using improved sanitation	65	34	51	32	75
Population using an improved water source	83	40	50	36	83
	88	50	66	43	90
Infant mortality rate	55	74	87	100	
Under-five mortality rate	68	119	149	145	
Gini index	57.8	47.5	44.6	47.3	57.0

Source: Human Development Report, 2007 PNUD

Table 1 shows differences on the socioeconomic configuration of Brazil and African countries. Beginning by HDI, even by comparing Brazil and South Africa, the best located country in the HDI rank, differences are important. Brazil has HDI 0.8 and is in the inferior limit of the high development classification index, while South Africa has HDI 0.674, belonging to the medium development index category. Among other three countries, two, Madagascar and Cameroon, rank human development index close to South Africa, while the other one, Mozambique, ranks lowest in comparison to the continent as a whole.

When we look to the access of the population to public goods, we notice that they behave similarly. By taking data such as population not using an improved water source, we see that Brazil and South Africa are situated in similar positions, about 10% in Brazil and 12% in South Africa. If we take as well the data of population using improved sanitation and the GINI index, they do completely coincide in 57%. By taking the other three African countries of the sample, it is possible to observe lower values for improved water source (between 57% and 34%), or for sanitation conditions (between 32% and 51%).

We may point, then, with respect to general data, two specific questions. In first place, it is worth mentioning that there are similar deficiencies in the access of public goods for both countries, although African ones are now in the same situation of the context Brazil dealt in the final of the authoritarian period with regards to sanitation access (Santos, 1987) and below regarding the access to improved water source.

In second place, if we take the GINI index as an indirect indicator of the bad distribution of public goods, all countries are found in similar positions, with Brazil having more inequalities in this access in comparison to the average of the African countries. Therefore, it is possible to assert that structural questions that motivated the introduction of PB are present in Africa.

### **3. EVALUATING BRAZILIAN CITIES WITH PB**

When we change the amplitude of the comparison, from countries to cities, we notice that, despite a high human development urban profile, PB also comports variations, as shown in table 2 below:

**Table 2**  
Comparison of socioeconomic data of the cities with PB

	Vitória	Recife	Fortaleza	Guarulhos	Osasco	Embú	Belo Horizonte	Porto Alegre	Várzea Paulista	Biguaçu	Maragogipe
<b>Human development index</b>	0,856	0,797	0,786	0,798	0,818	0,772	0,839	0,865	0,795	0,818	0,634
<b>Human Poverty Index</b>	43,31	44,77	43,73	50,64	48,81	53,27	40,64	42,99	48,11	36,86	57,08
<b>Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40</b>	7,04	10,54	9,78	8,11	6,5	7,53	7,5	6,79	5,94	3,95	11,81
<b>Population not using an improved water source</b>	2,56	12,23	11,49	3,48	1,42	5,63	1,96	2,2	5,12	1,62	51,32
<b>Population, annual growth rate</b>	12,96	8,60	21,08	36,35	15,30	33,13	10,81	8,68	34,65	38,79	3,87
<b>Population using improved sanitation</b>	95,73	84,23	84,03	95,27	96,61	92,34	96,9	95,41	94,5	95,64	41,96
<b>Infant mortality rate</b>	26,73	29,78	34,57	19,76	15,62	18,26	27,25	18,06	14,21	12,92	36,1
<b>Under-five mortality rate</b>	29,02	47,52	54,59	22,6	17,88	20,88	29,83	18,33	16,27	12,93	56,58
<b>Gini index</b>	0,61	0,87	0,78	0,4	0,38	0,45	0,62	0,61	0,43	0,5	0,55

Source: Human Development Atlas, UNDP

Data from table 2 express variations in the urban infrastructure and socio-economic conditions in twelve Brazilian cities, most of them members of the PB Brazilian Web. The following characteristics are seen: eight are capitals and three are smaller, with less than 100 thousand inhabitants. Among the capitals, two are located in the Southeast region. Among the three with less than a 100 thousand inhabitants, one is in the Northeast region. When we look to variations in HDI, we found from cities ranking above the Brazilian average, as Osasco and Vitória, to cases as Maragogipe, in Bahia, with HDI 0.634. This HDI, which covers 16% of Brazilian municipalities with PB (Avritzer and Wampler, 2008), is a little bit lower than South African HDI and is situated in a intermediary level between this

country and Madagascar and Cameroon. Then, the first finding is that there is a superposition of HDIs that allows the comparison of the countries and cities of the sample.

The comparison between Brazilian and African cities seems even more factible when we compare poverty indexes among the countries. Although being Brazil a country with HDI in the inferior limit of the countries with high human development (those with HDI higher than 0.800), it is also a country with high poverty concentrations. Both index used show that. Poverty index in Brazilian cities achieve about 40%, while in the case of the five African countries, they start in inferior levels, such as in South Africa, with 23.5%, and in Cameroon and Madagascar, with 30%, getting higher than Brazil only in the case of Mozambique. Therefore, once again, we see that comparison is possible in the case of the 5 countries.

In third place, there is the question of the urban infrastructure, central to the introduction of Participatory Budgeting. When we analyze two relevant urban indicators, which are population not using an improved water source and population using improved sanitation, once again we notice comparable situations. Regarding the first one, access varies greatly if we compare Southeast capitals with Northeast capitals. Last, Maragogipe has one the worst index. Therefore, it is possible to make the following asserts on the set of cities and countries treated:

- PB emerged in Brazil as a way to ameliorate the access of low income population to public goods. One of its presumptions is an unequal distribution of these goods motivated both by poverty and

inequality. We can see that in the African countries of the sample, both factors linked to inequality are present;

- In second place, it is worth noticing that PB works well in Brazil in a certain level of HDI and poverty. We found for the African countries comparable indexes, although not equal. This indicates that a comparison of indicators and practices among Brazilian and African cities might be useful. We found for some cities with PB similar indicators of poverty and of low access to public goods present in African cities.

In the next section of this report, we will compare PBs practices in several Brazilian cities, attempting to point out variations and to make comparisons.

#### **4. PROSPECTING OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL PB CASES**

The perspective of comparison and implementation of Participatory Budgeting in african cities might be achieved, in a first moment, by the systematization of the characteristics of Brazilian cities that effectively work with the program. In this sense, in order to elaborate a specific action plan in function of the type of city for the performance of the program, it is worth making a prospecting of the fundamental characteristics of PB in the cities in which it has been successfully functioning.

This part of the report is dedicated exactly to this, from the study and analysis of some variables which are in the basis of the successful character of those cases. These variables were divided into three specific dimensions.

First, the dimension “Existence and organization of PB”, in which there will be discussed elements concerned not only to the formalization, but to the effective functioning and execution of the program. Second, the dimension “Dynamicity of PB”, that counts with a discussion of specific factors of the program that concur for its success. Third, the dimension “Monitoring and Evaluation of PB”, in which a debate of the effective impact of the program in the municipalities in which it is adopted will be handled.

#### **4.1 The administrative organization of PB**

The first set of variables to be analyzed conforms perspectives of existence and organization of Participatory Budgeting. In Brazil, there is not a prerogative of formalization of the program through, i.e., the adoption of laws. On the contrary, the existence of PB tends to be dependent on the political will of the public manager, what configures a factor that defines the whole functioning of the program and, therefore, draws any possibility of triumph. In this perspective, PB is dependent on the importance the manager attributes to it as an instrument for planning and implementing public policies. In Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, for instance, mostly famous and successful cases, the program was created by the Executive branch and its functioning has been systematically linked to it. Along the 90’s, even the creation and implementation of the PB Councils was proposed by the Executive.

Notwithstanding, most recently a new discussion on the formalization of PB as instrument for the planning and implementation of public policies has been brought into the field. In the cases analyzed, this factor becomes certainly patent, as seen in table 3 below:

**Table 3**

Legal/Formal instrument for PB

	%
<b>Law</b>	36,4
<b>Internal rules</b>	54,5
<b>NA</b>	9,1
<b>Total</b>	100

Source: Data collected for the present research

As observed, in the majority of cases, there is a formal instrument guiding the functioning of PB, which is the Internal Rules Document. However, this document says nothing on the creation and continuity of the program, although it is worth asserting that cities which PB counts with it are certainly more organized than the ones in which PB does not count with it, including its functioning. A different situation, however, is already found in a relevant percentage of cases, 36.4%.

In these cases, there is a law that factually manages the creation and existence of PB and not only its' functioning. In this matrix are great size and importance cities, such as Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, and Guarulhos. As stated, the discussion on the formalization or not of the program has received little attention from the specialized literature, but, as seen, it is possible to notice a movement that goes exactly in this direction by public managers.

It must be noticed that the existence of a law that creates and defines the existence of PB does not necessarily concurs for the success of the program. Of crucial relevance for that are the financial and human resources destined to it, exclusive prerogative of the Executive branch. PB is program that demands constant planning, given its character of continuity in time. In this

sense, it requires, by one side, resources for its realization, and, on the other side, a compromised and responsible work team.

In Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, the Executive branch always conferred open support for the program, what implied the destination of money and people for its execution. Although being a city that counts with a law that manages the creation of the program, in Belo Horizonte, for instance, it is possible to assert that this attitude from the Executive of conferring importance to its execution is what has factually contributed to its success.

A variable capable to inform the level of importance given to PB by the government is the administrative organization around the program, as seen in table 4 below:

**Table 4**  
Administrative allocation of PB

	%
<b>Planning Secretary</b>	36,4
<b>Sector directly subordinated to the Executive branch</b>	63,6
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

Among the cities analyzed that execute the PB, the first thing to be noticed is that all of them concentrate its execution in administrative instances of great importance to the public management, which are the Planning Secretary and a Sector directly subordinated to the Executive branch. Both the destination of money and the allocation of human resources receive great support in these instances. Notwithstanding, in the majority of cases, more than 60%, the functioning is directly subordinated to the municipal

Executive, which implies, above all, greater independence to make such process. Even though, however, it is worth noticing that important cases, such as Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Vitória, and Fortaleza, are those in which PB is allocated in the Planning Secretary, what implies its execution in consonance with the general public planning of the city, through the action of technicians and specialized personal for the conformation of work teams and functioning of the program.

In this way, it is possible to say that the success of PB is linked not only to the political will of the public manager with regards to its implementation, but, mainly, for its functioning and maintenance over time. Successful cases, as seen, are those in which financial and human resources are made available exclusively for the program, through the allocation in administrative instances with high decision enforcement over these variables. The importance of this administrative organization is made patent when we analyze its own functioning.

One of the ways to make such analysis refers to the timing cycle of the program. PBs timing cycle is the number of meetings that define the final list of priorities for the execution of the budgeting. In annual cycles, for instance, the whole process of regional demands and the final decision taken from the meeting between regional delegates and municipality technicians occurs in an annual basis. This means that every year a list with priorities for investment is approved to be executed. The majority of cities that, until today, execute PB, have been doing it in an annual basis, such as, for instance, the cases of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Fortaleza.

The coordination of cycles depends upon the managing capacity of the responsible people, whether to the planning of specific schedules, whether for a final step of implementation of the approved ventures. Amongst the analyzed cases, timing cycles are distributed as shown in table 5 below:

**Table 5**  
PB timing cycle

	%
<b>Annual</b>	54,5
<b>Biannual</b>	36,4
<b>Quadriannual</b>	9,1
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

As observed, the majority of cases adopt the annual timing cycle as a planning factor for the implementation of the program. The annual cycle allows for, on one side, a greater dynamicity of the program, with the possibility of approval of several works alongside an administrative management, for instance. However, on the other side, it requires greater compromising and administrative organization, once schedules should be rigorously followed in both the discussion and implementation stages. Adopting the annual timing cycle implies running the risk of superposing works between one cycle and its previous one, i.e., with the approval of works in a specific year without even having initiated the implementation of the works of the previous year.

In this sense, it is possible to observe the some cities have already adopted a greater timing cycle for the realization of the program, with a relevant percentage of 36.4% executing it biannually. In this matrix are found important cities, such as Belo Horizonte, Guarulhos, and Vitória, which

attribute a greater timing for the performance of discussion and, mainly, the factual capacity of concretization of the demands. Reinforces this argument the fact that Belo Horizonte and Vitória, for instance, had already adopted the annual timing cycle for a specific period, but decided to change it. We see, therefore, that, although the annual timing cycle constitutes the option of the majority of cases, cities in which PB is successful in the long-term are tending to adopt the biannual timing cycle, reinforcing the importance not only of the discussion and priorities defining stage, but, mainly, the stage of effective implementation of those priorities, recognizing the necessity of a greater care for this step.

A last factor that concurs for the administrative and organizational capacity of PB is related to the decentralization of the program execution. As its main pillar, resides the objective of democratizing the access of the population to specific public ventures, capially in the case of those regions that count with little urban infrastructure. For this, by adopting the participatory methodology to proceed to the prioritizing of investments, there came out the necessity of “giving voice” to citizens, guaranteeing the possibility of participation of all in the process.

Cities that implement PB, in this sense, in function of this necessity, have developed decentralization strategies of the decision instances, principally, in the case of those ones with greater population size. Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, since the beginning of the experience, adopted the sub-regional execution of the program, with the division of the city in planning regions (Avritzer, 2002). The methodology of execution of PB was formulated based in this sub-regional division, which, in the case of Porto Alegre, counted with 16 planning regions (Marquetti, 2004), and, in Belo Horizonte,

specifically 9 regions (Belo Horizonte, 2000). In this last case, the PLANO DIRETOR of the city (1995) defined 81 spatial unities called Planning Unities (Unidades de Planejamento – Ups). Each UP was responsible for a determined territory of the city with regards to the planning of meetings and definition of priorities to be voted for (Pires, 2003; Avritzer, 2002).

Decentralizing the execution of the program allowed for its openness and to be taken to basically all parts of the cities. Regarding the analyzed cases of this research, it was possible to observe a similar picture, as seen in table 6 below:

**Table 6**  
Sub-regional performing of PB

	%
<b>No</b>	9,1
<b>Yes</b>	90,9
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

In basically all cases, as seen, PB is performed in a decentralized manner. It is noticing that in only 1 case, Maragogipe, there is no decentralization and that exactly this case is the one with smaller population size, with approximately 20 thousand inhabitants. In this sense, it is possible asserting that, although relevant, decentralizing is not a necessary and/or obligatory step, depending upon the population size of the municipalities, once Maragogipe is a successful case in which this factor is not present.

Regarding the dimension “Existence and organization of PB”, therefore, it is possible to make some inferences of characteristics and patterns of the successful cases analyzed. In first place, although the existence of a law that

determines the existence of the program is important so to confer stability and formalism, it does not necessarily guarantee the success and/or even functioning of the process.

Actually, it is still dependent upon the political will of the public manager, once crucial for the program are the financial and human resources destined to it. In this sense, cases in which there are formalizing laws, but there is not this destination of resources, may tend to failure, once PB demands money and personal to factually exist, to be concretized, performed. In second place, the distributive capacity of the program is quite related to its administrative capacity, mainly on the performing of objectives and goals previously established.

Therefore, if, by one side, cities that adopt annual cycles tend to have a greater number of approved works, on the other side, they tend as well to be those ones in which the risk of not implementing these works, superposing the works of the previous year, are greatly increased. In this way, biannual timing cycles tend to confer greater level of guarantee of effective implementation/concretization of the works approved in paper and has been the option of a crescent number of PB managers. In third and last place, the administrative decentralization is a useful strategy so to make that discussions factually be accessible to all citizens in a given territory. However, it does not configure a necessary element, once, as seen, smaller size cities, such as Maragogipe, eventually perform successfully the program without recurring to such resource. The next topic will be dedicated to the dimension “Dynamicity of PB”, discussing specific elements that influence the functioning of the program.

#### 4.2 PB dynamicity elements

The analysis of the administrative apparatus concerned to the performing and even existence of PB has revealed important characteristics for the composition of an action plan for its implementation in diversified contexts. In order so to accomplish such aim, however, it is necessary analyze, moreover, specific characteristics of the program related to its own dynamic, which means, related to its own functioning and institutional mission, which is based the democratization of public goods (or an egalitarian distribution of such goods). In this topic, therefore, we will analyze factors or elements that condition the concretization of this mission, or, in other words, variables that influence the degree of democratization achieved by the program.

Based on the access to public goods, PB is usually focused on the prioritization of urban infrastructure works. The demand for such kind of works in Brazil is not only noticeable, but, it may be asserted, is of extreme relevance, resulting from an increasing urbanization on the last decades made usually without any planning politics. Yet, it is worth saying that this is not a “privilege” of Brazil. In its’ report “World population status 2007”, the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA) launched the alert that, by one side, estimates predicted that in 2009 world urban population would surpass for the first time the rural population; on the other side, however, urban planning politics would be, until so, basically inexistent in front of the increasing percentage. The resulting picture would be urban agglomerations in which an increasing number of people without access to basic public services, such as sanitation, electric energy, and so on. This alert had already been given in another report of the same organism in 2003, on the growth of

slums, in which, according to data, would have been living one third of the world population (UNFPA, 2003).

In Brazil, it is possible to assert that urban planning politics have been insufficient to keep up with the growth percentage. Table 7 below compare data of such growth with Mozambique:

Table 7  
Degree of urbanization

Regions of Brazil	Years			Mozambique (General)	Years			
	1991	2000	2005		1997		2007	
					N	%	N	%
Brasil	75,6	81,3	82,8	Urban	4,604,371	28,6	7,760,810	37,8
North	59,1	69,9	74,4					
Northeast	60,7	69,1	70,8	Rural	11,494,829	71,4	12,769,904	62,2
Southeast	88,0	90,5	91,8					
Southeast	74,1	80,9	82,5					
Center-West	81,3	86,7	86,0					


Source: IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística); Mozambique Govern

As observed, for all regions of the country, it is pointed out a constant growth of urban population, usually without specific planning politics. Southeast is the local that counts with the greater urban percentage, 91,8%. Being the most rich region of the country, it is usually the destination of those looking for better life conditions coming from many other regions, in a process called “immigration”, or even “rural exodus”. In absolute numbers, this means that millions of individuals have left country in the last decades and the majority lives in the cities with precarious access to basic services, or even without any access. In this same vein, it is worth noticing that in Mozambique, in no more than 10 years, urban population has

increased 9.2%, whilst rural population diminished basically this same amount.

In general, it is observed a growth pattern in cities from downtown to periphery, whilst, for instance, life costs “expel” those less wealthier from commercial centers. This process of “territorial

**Picture 1**  
São Paulo urban spot evolution



exclusion” (Avritzer & Pires, 2004) is perpetuated in many urban centers, as seen in picture 1 beside, representing the urban spot for the city of São Paulo, Brazil.


As a way to deal with such problematic of the disordered growth of urban centers and the exclusion of a great part of the population in matters of access to basic public services and public goods, PB methodology is introduced based on two specific pillars. First, the using of objective criteria for the destination of public investments in these areas. Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, for instance, have been concentrating efforts on the composition and refining of specific index for public investments, such as the IQVU, the *Urban Life Quality Index* for Belo Horizonte. It is composed by variables and indicators of diverse dimensions, from habitation to buying power of citizens, and, by adopting weighting techniques, it is able to map

with efficacy the locals of the city that should be prioritized for specific order of resources.

Beyond this index, there has been also bring into discussion another one called IVS, the *Social Vulnerability Index*. Through its adoption, it is possible to “measure” the degrees of vulnerability of individuals and families/households in the territory, easing the decision making process regarding the direction of public investments (Avritzer & Pires, 2004).

Map 1 below shows a specific relation between public investments made through the utilization of PB methodology and areas prioritized for public planning by both index discussed above for the city of Belo Horizonte, in the period 1994 to 1999. In the first map, on the left, each point represents a specific work made by the program in this period. By looking at the map on the right, which represents the prioritized Planning Units by the indexes, it

**Map 1** – Comparison of PB investments X IVS/IQVU in Belo Horizonte



is noticeable an overlapping of the places where works have been made with darker places that represent more social vulnerability. This indicates objectivity in the prioritizing and effective implementation of PB ventures (Avritzer & Pires, 2004).

Moreover, in table 8 besides, we can see that, for lower IQVU intervals, i.e., for places in which the index has shown greater exclusion regarding access to basic public services, the degree of investments through time increased in the city of Belo

Table 8  
**Public investments and IVS Belo Horizonte**

IQVU interval	Investments average rate (R\$)	Public works average rate
0.570 - 0.645	93,374.20	0.50
0.491 - 0.550	307,255.1	0.84
0.463 - 0.488	1,185,151.05	2.08
0.423 - 0.456	1,075,192.75	2.44
0.384 - 0.415	1,149,208.66	1.73
0.328 - 0.368	1,221,302.76	1.82

Source: Pires (2003)

Horizonte (Pires, 2003). There is a clear correlation between the worsening of the index and the increasing of investments.

Beyond the usage of objective criteria for directing public investments, PB is pelted by the prioritization of another relevant criteria for the democratization on the access of basic services: the direct participation of the poorest people in the decision making process. The possibility of participation on the prioritization of investments is an advance in relation to other public investments politics, once implies “giving voice” to those factually less favored.

PB, therefore, operates not only with the utilization of the above mentioned indexes, with strict objectivity, but, on the other side, it directs this objectivity for the poorest parcels, democratizing budget decision. Interesting observing that the combination of these criteria confers not only



regions of the city. Following, the most adopted criteria are participation and social politics. It is worth noticing, one time else, that these are not less important criteria for the performing of the program, but, on the contrary, they act as strengthening pillars for the democratization of the distribution. These data only reinforce, therefore, the assertion that PB implementation must be based on these two elements: objective criteria for the direction of resources and the participation, for the democratization of investments.

If, by one side, then, the criteria adopted for planning PB is a factor that influence its own functioning and even existence, it is worth taking into round another one not less important, which is the origins of the resources allocated to the program. As already seen, PB demands both financial and human resources for an adequate functioning. Situations in which any one of them are insufficient, or even missing, will tend to failure. That is why it is important to analyze them both, considering that they are found intimately linked in theirs´ origins. Cities may have as source of financial resources its own tax revenues and make a destination of part these resources to PB.

Being capable of collecting its own tax revenues may indicate important characteristics of the city with respect to its administrative organization: by one side, they are usually under control of the municipalities and its increasing depends upon this organization; on the other side, they then constitute important indicators of administrative modernization efforts by local governments (Pires & Tomás, 2004). As PB is dependent on the organization and responsibility of the public administration, it is expected, in this sense, that successful cases be the ones in which the greater parcel of the resources come from own tax revenues collecting. In fact, table 10 below gives clear indications of this correlation:

**Table 10**  
PB financial resources origin

	%
<b>Specific projects</b>	36,4
<b>Own tax revenues</b>	63,6
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

In most of the successful PB cases analyzes, the origin of the resources allocated for the program is own tax revenues colleting. This indicates that, in fact, as asserted, cities administratively organized are the one in which the program tends to success. On the other side, there is a reasonable percentage of cases in which resources come from specific projects. These are cities that, although do not count with own tax revenues collecting, are quite organized in order to submit projects, for instance, to federal financing lines so to implement the works prioritized in PB.

Then, although they do not have their own resources, they count with an organized and legalized administration capable of capturing resources for most of the projects prioritized in PB meetings, guaranteeing the functioning and performing of the program over time. In any manner, therefore, as seen, only in cases of administrative organized cities are the ones in which PB tends to be successful.

A last factor/element capable to influence the functioning and even existence of PB is related to the real possibilities of implementing the prioritized works. Cases in which the prioritizing process do exist, but, on the other side, there is no capacity for its effective implementation, tend to

failure. Then, it is necessary to equilibrate municipal capacities with demands presented in the meetings. In Belo Horizonte, from 1998 on, the program counted with a specific apparatus of technical analysis of the demands presented based on specific urban planning pre-requisites (Pires, 2008).

Planning instruments, such as the *Plano Diretor*, the regional director plans, the *Lei de Ocupação e Uso do Solo* (law on occupation and usage of land), among others, would be taken as parameters for viability analysis of the demands presented in PB meetings, and those ones that were not in conformity or were even contrary to such parameters would be dismissed. This would avoid the approval, for instance, of non viable works for depending on other services unable to be executed for being contrary to the parameters.

Making a technical analysis of the demands presented constitutes, then, a relevant factor for the factual concretization of PB. Successful cases are the ones in which this analysis exist and, in a 100% of the analyzed case in this report, this is valid. However, it is worth analyzing, moreover, the moment this analysis occur, as table 11 below shows:

**Table 11**  
Moment technical analysis occur

	%
<b>Before begining works</b>	27,3
<b>Before taking to final deliberation</b>	72,7
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

In the majority of cases, there is a technical analysis of the demands before their presentation to the final deliberation of the delegates Council. In this sense, there is an initial filter so the undertaken debate in this instance takes as object elements potentially implementable. On the other side, a relatively small percentage of cases consist on those in which the analysis occurs only before the beginning of works, that means, after being approved by delegates. It is worth saying, therefore, that previous technical analysis, made before subjecting demands to the Council to a final deliberation, constitutes criteria adopted by most of PB successful cases and, so, it is a factor of great importance for its performing and functioning. In the next section, we will discuss the final part of this functioning, regarding PBs monitoring and evaluation.

#### **4.3 PB Monitoring and evaluation**

PB is a program of public resources distribution that aims at democratizing budget decisions, mainly in function of the so called less favored. In this sense, its main objective is to give access to basic public goods and services to those territorially excluded. The potential impacts on population, therefore, are relevant. Moreover, basically the whole performing of the program is linked to the direct participation of those people, not only in the discussion phase, when priorities are really defined, but, as well, on the monitoring and accompanying of the factual concretization of its mission.

The monitoring of public actions is potentialized in PB because of the possibility of direct participation of citizens. This openness is usually called by the specialized literature as “accountability”, referring to a necessary accountancy governments should give society in matters of actions taken as

managers of public resources and, therefore, direct responsible for the decision making processes in specific politics (Peruzzotti, 2004). It may be stated that the success of the program is greatly linked to the monitoring individuals exercise regarding the factual implementation of the works approved in the meetings. In this way, successful cases tend to be those that count with specific monitoring instances capable of playing such role, as seen in table 12 below:

**Table 12**  
Existence of monitoring instance

	%
<b>No</b>	27,3
<b>Yes</b>	72,7
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

As observed, a relevant percentage of 72,7% of cases count with specific monitoring instances on the actions played in PB. In those cases, there is an effective accompanying of the implementation of the demands presented and approved in the assemblies, trying to assure the avoidance of superposition of works amongst the timing cycles. Belo Horizonte, for instance, counts with an instance called COMFORÇA, the PB Commission on accompanying and supervision of works, which is responsible for the surveillance of the ventures approved and make meetings on a regular basis, developing and presenting reports on the works status.

Moreover, important cities such as Porto Alegre, Recife, Guarulhos, Fortaleza, and Osasco, also count with institutionalized monitoring instances, linked, each one, to the PB Council. Chances that all ventures

effective be implemented usually increase, therefore, as this surveillance exist by PB users. Notwithstanding, recently, there has been taken into scene a perspective on the auto-evaluation of the program as a relevant variable for its correct functioning. Then, more and more cities are creating, beyond the monitoring instances, evaluation mechanisms of PB impact on their respective territories.

The evaluation of public policies is an area of urban planning still incipient in Brazil (Marquetti, Campo e Pires, 2008). Yet, in the case of PB, more and more it is realized its importance for beyond the constant accompanying of the works. Evaluating the impacts of program in the cities allows for the direction of actions and future investments priorities, as well as the correction of institutional ventures, relative to its own internal dynamics. Table 13 below gives an indication on it regarding the functioning of the program:

**Table 13**  
Existence of PB evaluation  
mechanism

	%
<b>No</b>	54,5
<b>Yes</b>	45,5
<b>Total</b>	100,0

Source: Data collected for the present research

Although most of the analyzed cases do not count with evaluation mechanisms, a relevant percentage of 45,5% of cities have already created this device. This is a recent “movement” that gains more and more relevance, especially in important cities in which PB has been successful for years, such as Porto Alegre and Recife, pioneers in the implementation of the program.

## 5. RECOMMENDATION

From the comparison of Brazilian and African indicators, it was possible to make a double exercise: on one side, we compared indexes on poverty and access to public good in different African countries. This comparison showed that there is a relative proximity with the same indexes for Brazil, with special attention to poverty ones. Some indexes are situated in quite similar levels, what allows for comparability. On the other side, we proceeded to a compared systematization of PB practices in 12 cities. Even no counting with significant statistical value, it allows for having a quite precise picture on the best PB practices introduced in Brazil. Based on the previous sections of the this work, we can make the following recommendations:

PB's introduction should involve some kind of legal legislation or guideline. Even being this a question that is quite variable in Brazil, the country's 20 years experience with the program makes it possible to state that experiences without any kind of legal institutionalization are subject to variations in the political system that are common both in Brazil and in African countries. Avoiding these variations and guaranteeing some kind of administrative continuity/consistency is quite important for PB success.

Using, as much as possible, regional decentralization criteria. This has been one of the greatest positive element of PB along its existence in Brazil. 90% of all researched cities do make use of some regional criteria on the evaluation of the necessity to implement the works. It seems of seminal importance that African cities that ought to implement the program make use of similar criteria. Once decentralization is implemented, it is also

relevant to associate it with three kind of political and/or technical-administrative processes that appear in table 9: regional penury/IQVU, participation, and priorities on the implementation of social policies. The implementation of such criteria in the regions and their association with the participatory process is, in our opinion, the central element for PB success.

In third place, it is important to determine the resources available and the relation between own resources and external resources. As could be observed, most of PB cases researched do count with resources collected by the city (63,6%). However, it is not negligible the number of cases that count with external resources. When we think on cities such as Osasco, Fortaleza, and Várzea Paulista, we realize that cases that count with such resources may be also successful. Probably, there will be more cases based on external resources in Africa than in Brazil. The question that raises for a successful implementation of PB in Africa is not whether it may count only with own collected resources, what is, in a matter of fact, quite beyond the reality of those countries, but, combining own resources and external resources depending upon each specific case.

Last, it is worth making some suggestions on the public control field. Participatory Budgeting is a way of distributing public goods more equally, but it is, moreover, a way of ensuring public control. The fact that the budget is pre-determined and that municipal administration make commitments on works, also helps making this control. This should be a quite important dimension on African cases. It is important realizing that public control dimension has lower costs than the distributive dimension, and usually brings important results for wider sectors than those involved in

PB. Implementing forms of public control on social policies should be one of the priorities of PB in Austral Africa, then.

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